I get your point, but… doesn’t matter. Er, at least for the argument I was making.
Even if Cylons did not exhibit human-like personality traits and human-analogue behaviours, even if they were completely mechanoid (albeit with ‘consciousness’), the process of downloading would still destroy the original individual. From the other Cylons or from the ‘collective’ viewpoint this would not be so. Nor would it be so from the new Cylon.
Oooh… I like your thinking.
I want to return to this, HT.
Do we know this is the case? Are we certain that resurrected Cylons gain the benefit of all previous experience of their total model line, or only from the particular individual which has (according to me) perished?
If Athena dies tomorrow (near a Resurrection Ship), does the ‘new’ Boomer/Athena/Eight gain all of the insight, memory, personality, character of original Boomer, new Boomer, as well as Athena? Seriously, there’s a lot of scope for conflict there, not to mention exponentially greater memory storage requirements.
I think it has been disclosed (by the Athena-to-be Eight on Caprica perhaps?) that Cylons can access previous (defunct) model’s information, but has it actually been stated that they are resurrected with all that?
I do not think so (according to my very fallible human memory at least), and thus this can help explain the widening gap within versions of new models: Eights and Sixes growing apart.
I agree on the life is precious point.
But, what I was saying was that if all the memories download then how can the person have said to have died? That is like saying the me of a second ago died. (Granted, logically I can’t prove that I wasn’t created a second ago with all my memories.) But, if something is lost when the Cylon dies, then what is that something? I’d say it is as close to a soul as anything. My point is that your point is that the soul doesn’t download.
(Yes, I know the sentence structure of that last sentence makes small children cry.)
This is exactly what I was trying to explain, but obviously not all that well.
From an outside perspective the resurrected person is the same, and has not died.
From the perspective of the newly-resurrected person they have what seem continuous thoughts and memories, and thus they do not feel they have died.
But… from the point of view of the original person and their unique consciousness they are quite dead.
Imagine an instant snapshot is made of you: your thoughts, memories, personality, everything. Somehow this is transferred into an empty clone of you. You don’t suddenly start seeing the world through the clone’s eyes, and experiencing what he does. Obviously. And then suppose a big metal guy shoots you. Dead. You know what? No one else can tell the clone apart from the original you. Even the clone thinks he’s you. To him, he is you.
But you know he is not, and cannot be, because you are dead. The unique you is over with; the fact that some other carcass holds your old memories does not make it you.
But, if something is lost when the Cylon dies, then what is that something? I’d say it is as close to a soul as anything. My point is that your point is that the soul doesn’t download.
The uniqueness of the individual Cylon is lost when they die. Just like you and me. I guess we could call that uniqueness a ‘soul’ <grimmace>, but that is a ‘laden’ concept. Regardless, you are correct: that continuous existence does not download. I suggest that it cannot.
The more I think about this, the more convinced I am that I am correct. Now, it may not play out in the denouement of BSG, and may in fact be shown to be contrary to the BSG universe. But I still think I am right.
If you die (or transport in the Trek universe) you really die. The individual that was you is gone forever. What returns is identical in every way, except it is not the same you.
And after this mind-blowing existential exposition, I must abed, as it is 3:30am.
To me it matters insofar as I think that your discussion of resurrection can only be true if the Cylon do in fact identify the individual vs. the model, and I’m not sure that that distinction was always made throughout the series, though I certainly would agree that it is currently the case.
Think about that sentence a bit. Identical in every way but somehow different.
Okay, think about after you have had some sleep and maybe a cookie.
I’ve always been mildly bothered that they insist on calling the process ‘resurrection’ when it’s really closer to reincarnation. By the Cylons’ beliefs, the original body is dead, and the soul is transferred to a new body. That is reincarnation, not resurrection.
However, let me argue that the Cylons seem to believe that memories and experiences are what create an individual soul. The memories are downloaded into one new body, not distributed among all new bodies—they may also be added to the database for other Cylons to look at, but they believe that those memories, transferred to a new body, also transfer the consciousness and soul. By some beliefs, the consciousness and soul are the sum of your memories and experiences—certainly, Boomer is who she is because of her particular experiences, and even other Eights who know the memories don’t deviate wildly from the norm as she did. For a race that is so highly group-minded, they sure place a high value on individuality in the identification of a consciousness.
I’m not sure where I was going with that, so I’ll just leave it as it is.
But if, as you maintain, the soul does not exist, that original person no longer has a point of view (valid or otherwise) upon death, so does it really matter? If, on the other hand, the soul does exist, then there’s no reason that it could not also transfer to the new body, thereby preserving the continuity of personhood. This is purely a philosophical point with no real-world (or BSGverse) application. If the sum total of existence is transferrable, arguably the loss of the “original” is a moot point. Sure, the “copy” will have some angst about the deeper meaning of existence, but without a metaphysical component, the only difference is the one he or she wishes to make of it. Introducing the soul simplifies the argument but also effectively nullifies it. You really can’t have it both ways. 
The reason why I believe they do sync is dependent on the events surrounding Boomer’s assasination attempt on Adama and contact with Athena during the search for the Tomb of Athena (funny). In Galactica’s morgue the recovered Adama asks Boomer “why” repeatedly I believe and breaks down. When he tackles Athena on the planet’s surface she finally responds “you asked why?” At that point Boomer is on a base star. Even an assumed posthumous experience has been shared in the collective of 8s.
Side note. That event is the same reason I formed the belief that the machine could sustain the program after the body is considered dead. I interjected that the machinery may have to completely perish in order for the quasi-soul to transfer to another body.Roman this is important to your case This could also mean that yes, part of the program still exists in the ‘dead’ body even after it’s downloaded to another. I’d have to watch again, but I don’t think you know when Boomer is resurrected/reincarnated in referrence to Adama conversing with her first witnessed corpse. You do have a clear sense of timing after Helo corpses 
the second body, though.
There is a hole in there somewhere. I can’t put my finger on it.
Well, I know that the memories do get shared somehow, but Cylons who know those memories don’t seem to feel that they experienced them, while the one resurrected does. Perhaps the Cylon concept of a soul has more to do with experiences than just memories. Maybe there’s something special or different about memories that are first-hand… It just strikes me as odd, that they seem to share memories, and yet it is essentially nothing but memories that are transferred to a new body, continuing the individual. They must be conscious of memories that don’t belong to them, that they strictly did not experience… and yet we can have false memories such as in Boomer’s history.
So confusing and complicated. I’m up to The Farm in a rewatch I’m doing, and will keep an ear out for the Athena/Boomer memory mess when I get up to Home.
Whew… very nice point, HT. Of course, it might just be a legitimate mistake on the part of (differing) writers. :eek:
Side note. That event is the same reason I formed the belief that the machine could sustain the program after the body is considered dead. I interjected that the machinery may have to completely perish in order for the quasi-soul to transfer to another body.Roman this is important to your case This could also mean that yes, part of the program still exists in the ‘dead’ body even after it’s downloaded to another. I’d have to watch again, but I don’t think you know when Boomer is resurrected/reincarnated in referrence to Adama conversing with her first witnessed corpse. You do have a clear sense of timing after Helo corpses
Yes, would certainly explain your (cleverly) observed phenomena. I admit, I feel uncomfortable with lifeless corpses transmitting auditory information; when you’re dead, you’re dead.
Very good point. Follows on to my next point…
Originally Posted by Roman Sandstorm :
What returns is identical in every way, except it is not the same you.And after this mind-blowing existential exposition, I must abed, as it is 3:30am.
Yeah. Wasn’t brilliant, was it? I probably should have said: To an outside observer, and to the newly-created person themselves, what returns appears to be identical in every way, except it is not.
Well, yes. Certainly to the deluded D’Anna who has gotten herself blown away under the misapprehension that she is going to be returned. And to Athena, who got her hubby to waste her so she could rescue Hera.
… continuity of personhood.
Nice expression. And the core of my argument.
This is purely a philosophical point with no real-world (or BSGverse) application. If the sum total of existence is transferrable, arguably the loss of the “original” is a moot point. Sure, the “copy” will have some angst about the deeper meaning of existence, but without a metaphysical component, the only difference is the one he or she wishes to make of it. Introducing the soul simplifies the argument but also effectively nullifies it. You really can’t have it both ways.
My point does not even require a soul. I simply maintain that the ‘resurrected’ people are not the same as the dead ones. There is no way to empirically measure that the new one isn’t, just my logical argument. (And the ‘Two Rikers’ and numerous other transporter incidents in another universe serve to illustrate.)
I know I may seem to be splitting hairs here, and I’m sure it doesn’t really matter in the overall story.
Perhaps I’ll pose this question: How many of us GWC posters would voluntarily accept termination a la D’Anna or Athena in order to test the hypothesis? Especially give then doubts I may have raised that, sure, a new body with your thoughts and personality will come back, but there’s a chance that you will not.
Me? Not a chance in the world. No way. But then, I would not get in a Star Trek transporter either. You die in resurrection. You die in transporting. You die in rings. And you die in a Stargate. I tell you, future transport is risky.
I think Roman’s point (with out defining what a soul is) is that the soul doesn’t download when a Cylon dies (or a Trek character transports).
Scary.
Personally, I hate the take-it-apart theory of transporting and stargating. I am pretty sure that what you would end up with would not be an accurate copy.
I am going out on a limb and guessing that you don’t believe in an afterlife, so the you that goes through the transport would never know they made a mistake.
I’m thinking that Bill Adama is not so sure that all is copacetic with Saul Tigh re his over riding the order to open fire on the base star - despite Thigh’s explanation.
First, and less importantly, although Tigh was correct - that was some serious insubordination.
Second, when Adama later thanks him, he call him “Tigh”. That’s a first. He has NEVER called him that before. In official moments it’s always “Colonel” or “XO” and in personal moments it’s always “Saul”.
The use of “Tigh” was jarring to me. It’s not a big deal, don’t be surprised if Adama is developing doubts about what is going on with his old friend - including his sudden abstinence.
I mentioned this in another thread as well. What do you guys think?
Since Starbuck is the harbinger of death, I think she is the one who will destroy the Resurrection hub - thus bringing the possibility of permanent death - or mortality - to the entire Cylon race.
right after the copy it’s the same person. But since it’s the expereince and choices that defines a person, if the two of the same copy exists, they will soon be different person. If there is only 1 copy left, then you can say it’s the same person.
Yeah, I have been wondering exactly WHOSE end Starbuck is the harbinger of. The old man hybrid said something like “they must not follow her.” I suppose it’s possible he meant the Cylons but the context of that proclamation fits the Colonials better.
Anyway, the whole hub idea seems off. Why would it’s destruction affect any other resurrection ships? Maybe it means that all the consciousnesses of killed models go first to the hub and then are distributed. But that doesn’t make logistical sense and is a very inefficient use of such great technology.
Besides, they can build another hub eventually.